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Additionally, the child must somehow be returned to the country in question, or to the custody of the petitioner. Occasionally, the respondent will be ordered to travel with the child back to the left-behind parent’s country and deliver the child to the petitioner. More often, however, the child is removed from the respondent’s custody and entrusted to the petitioner or a representative for the petitioner. nbsp;The mother was awarded custody of their two minor children. The father was ordered to pay child support of $50 per month for each child. The father paid that support through September 1968, when he died. The mother filed a claim against the estate for $3,850, the amount claimed to be due for support under the decree from the father's death until the children reached majority. The district court dismissed the action holding that it appeared the mother had adequate protection under the probate laws under request for family allowances on distribution of the estate upon closing. P> Third, the formula creates a "football" mentality where litigants are given a financial incentive to achieve a particular custodial percentage, or custodial label, not necessarily for the benefit of the child, but because of the automatic impact on support calculations. This is just one of the specific ways in which there is a conflict between the holdings of Gemma and Fondi on the one hand ("the employee spouse cannot by election defeat the nonemployee spouse’s interest in the community property by relying on a condition solely within the employee spouse’s control") and the 1988 holding in O'Hara on the other (the "community property interests of a nonemployee spouse do not limit the employee’s freedom to agree to terms of retirement benefits").30 The problem, in a nutshell, is that when a retiree receives a post-divorce disability award, the "disposable" pay already divided between the member and former spouse is decreased, and money that was supposed to be paid to the former spouse is instead redirected to the retiree, no matter what the divorce court ordered. ii) Custody share. "Custody share" means the number of days that a parent has physical custody, whether by sole custody, joint legal or joint residential custody, or visitation, of a shared child per year divided by the number of days in the year. The actual or anticipated "custody share" of the parent who has or will have fewer days of physical custody shall be calculated for a one-year period. The "custody share" of the other parent shall be presumed to be the number of days in the year less the number of days calculated as the first parent's "custody share." For purposes of this calculation, the year may begin on such date as is determined in the discretion of the court, and the day may begin at such time as is determined in the discretion of the court. For purposes of this calculation, a day shall be as defined in subdivision G 3 (c). In the decree, the father was required to pay $300 per child or a total of $900 per month in child support. The mother requested increased support and the father requested increased visitation. When a proposed order was submitted, the district court, among other things, abated the father’s support obligation during his one month summer visitation and made the parties equally responsible for costs of transportation of the minor children. The mother contended these orders were outside of the court’s jurisdiction. Additionally, the child must somehow be returned to the country in question, or to the custody of the petitioner. Occasionally, the respondent will be ordered to travel with the child back to the left-behind parent’s country and deliver the child to the petitioner. More often, however, the child is removed from the respondent’s custody and entrusted to the petitioner or a representative for the petitioner. The 20/10/10 rule is not a limitation upon the subject matter jurisdiction of the State courts.2 Its practical effect is sometimes the same as a legal bar, however, which is one reason that the ABA position (for over a decade) has been that the provision should be repealed.3 A former spouse in possession of an order that does not satisfy the rule must rely on whatever State law enforcement mechanisms are available, which may or may not be of any use. The reality is that the "rule" often produces inequity, while serving no valid public policy purpose of any kind. Where a post-military Civil Service career seems likely, allocation of the retirement benefits from that service should probably be explicitly set out in the original divorce decree. Where (as in most cases) it is only one possibility among many, the standard form clauses (allowing for issuance of a further order tracing the military retired pay and entry of a further order) are probably adequate. For example, in In re Marriage of McGhee,1 the court approved compensation to the former spouse by means of alimony, as set out in the agreement between the parties, when it was imposed by the dissolution court after the member halted the flow of military retirement benefits to former spouse after the McCarty decision. The court termed use of such "back-up" clauses to be making the property award "supportified." Similarly, in deciding In re Marriage of Sheldon,2 the court noted the "close relationship between the amount of a property division and the entitlement, if any, of a spouse to spousal support." In In re Marriage of Mastropaolo,3 the court "conditionally" reversed an alimony award "on condition" that the court’s affirmance of the retirement division became final. B> The Department of Defense Office of the Actuary publishes "lump sum equivalency" charts for military retirements, using military-specific mortality tables, and including a much-ignored disclaimer that its figures "should not be used for property settlements."27 The current figures are attached as an Exhibit to these materials. Framed as a word problem, the question presented is how to fairly adjust guideline child support based on "the amount of time the child spends with each parent," given the Nevada statutory guidelines, including its presumptive maximum provisions, across a wide variety of time-shares and parental incomes, while safeguarding the interest of the child to receipt of an adequate level of support in both households. A down side to this method of valuation is that it requires estimating, or flatly guessing, what the future will hold for the parties. It is thus likely that one of the parties will be shortchanged. For example, any estimation of present value takes into account the time value of money, by which a present value is always less than the amount that would otherwise be paid to an individual over a period of time. Expert witnesses frequently disagree strongly about the proper variables to apply, such as the correct interest rate to be used. Some federal circuits have expressed a greater inclination to rely upon the divorce courts’ distribution of benefits than have others. In Directors Guild v. Tise,4 the Ninth Circuit held: 65279;Regardless of the reasons, the result was fundamentally unfair because it deprived Petitioner of her entitlement to one-half of a substantial community asset with her receiving $677.50 per month less than the amount awarded her by the court. It was therefore appropriate for the trial court, in ruling on the motion by Petitioner for modification or clarification, to devise a formula which would again equitably divide the community assets without requiring the monthly amount payable to Petitioner to be paid direct from the Respondent's military retirement." The husband filed for divorce in Clark County. The wife mailed a demand for change of venue to the clerk of the court. The clerk’s office apparently did not immediately date stamp the document and it was ultimately filed four days later than the statute permitted. The district court found the demand was filed too late and denied the change of venue. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded stating: The premiums for Option A work like normal SBP premiums, in that they come "off the top" of benefits payable. Premiums for Options B and C are paid by way of that reduction, plus an actuarial reduction in the benefits paid. This is how the system accounts for coverage being in existence years before eligibility for retirement benefits is reached. The Supreme Court held that a partition can be made in either an annulment or a divorce action. The right to partition is one of the rights of a tenant in common. The Court noted that every tenant in common that had the right to the present enjoyment of the property, or the proceeds thereof, and was entitled to demand a partition of the property as a matter of right. The convenience or inconvenience of the parties is not to be considered. The district court’s decision of ordering the partition was affirmed as the lot could not be divided without great prejudice to the plaintiff. The question is sometimes asked whether these rules are really as clear, and "harsh," as they seem. For example, what if parents had been separated for more than six months, with the custodial parent and children living elsewhere, and the non-custodial parent living in Nevada, but they agreed that they wanted to go through a single, simple joint petition divorce here in Nevada disposing of all issues? NCCUSL3 went back to work and in 1997 issued revisions of the jurisdictional aspects of the UCCJA in a new act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, or UCCJEA. The replacement act was intended to provide clearer standards for which States can exercise original jurisdiction over a child custody determination, enunciate a standard of continuing jurisdiction for the first time, and to clarify modification jurisdiction. It also sought to harmonize the law on simultaneous proceedings, clean hands, and forum non conveniens. On those facts, the Court held that a district court should assess not only age disparity as set forth in Daniel, but also "whether the life expectancy of the payor will make a non-lump-sum alimony award illusory." To do so, a trial court should take into consideration the age and health of the payor, explicitly considering life expectancy, medical condition, and prospects for healthy living, so as to avoid "an illusory alimony award when a payor is known to be terminally ill or known to have low prospects for continued healthy living since it will allow the payee to continue to receive alimony in a manner that will assure [she is] supported past the payor’s death." The Supreme Court remanded for such an analysis. Unfortunately, the information posted by DFAS, while technically accurate, is somewhat misleading to a practitioner trying to find a simple route to collect a child support order. For example, the DFAS web site4 giving instructions for collecting "child and/or spousal support" from "active, reserve, and retired members of the military" (and civilian employees of the Federal government) does not mention the simple process above for collecting child support from military retired pay. The Seventh Circuit reached much the same result, but only by means of the tenuous finding that military retirement benefits are not part of the bankruptcy estate because post-petition services are required of the member, making the benefits post-petition wages.1 The parties were married 21 years. At the time of the marriage, the husband had a half-interest in a lawn business. Seven years after marriage, the lawn-care segment was sold, and the business name was changed to show it was a nursery. At the time of the divorce, the total value of stock in the nursery was between $581,000 and $589,000. The wife was 44 years old in which she had stayed home to raise two children. The district court awarded the wife $1,500 per month in alimony "until she completes her undergraduate degree or for a maximum of two years, whichever comes first." The Supreme Court reversed. If the disadvantaged party would have received more under community property laws, the agreement is presumed to be fraudulent. The presumption of fraud may be overcome by a finding of "no real disadvantage." The elements to consider are whether that party had ample opportunity to obtain independent advice of counsel, was not coerced into making rash decision by circumstances of signing agreement, had substantial business experience and acumen, and was aware of the financial resources of the other party and understood the rights being forfeited. You can find Expert Witness An Introduction to Pensions in Nevada Divorce Law Section I Subsection B In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for Alimony Section II Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection Las Vegas child custody expert Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Subsection II B Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar How to Allocate the SBP Premium Cost-Shifting Present Value A Bird in the Hand The Marren and Page Case List Hedlund v Hedlund Las Vegas family law specialist Expert Witness available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above. Site Map Reciprocal Links: Expert Witness Expert Witness Expert Witness Expert Witness Expert Witness Expert Witness Expert Witness Expert Witness Expert Witness web search engine optimization |
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